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1. Introduction 
A governmental budget is a financial plan for the 
period of one year that is submitted by the executive 
to the legislative body whose approval and authorisa-
tion is necessary before the plan can be executed (see 
Cleveland, 1992). The accuracy of these plans in the 
case of Czech municipalities is quite low: on average, 
the approved budgets amounted only to 82% of the 
executed budgets in 1997 to 2012 with significant 
differences among individual municipalities. The 
amount and structure of the approved expenditure 
depends critically on the amount of forecasted reve-
nues. While most of the revenues not included in the 
approved budgets are conditional intergovernmental 
transfers approved in the course of the budget year, 
other types of municipal revenues contribute to budget 
inaccuracy as well. 
The purpose of the paper is (1) to evaluate the ac-
curacy of municipal budgets and their major compo-
nents and (2) to explore the factors influencing tax 
revenue forecasting errors in order to identify the 
major causes of forecasting error differences among 
individual municipalities. 
While the accuracy of revenue forecasts at the 
Czech central government level has received repeated 
attention  (e.g., Klazar, 2003; Špalek and Moravanský, 
2005 or Bayer, 2011), the study of local government 
lags behind. Sedmihradská (2009) and Sedmihradská 
and Kramoliš (2012) show that the majority of munic-
ipalities underestimate their tax revenue forecasts and 
approve budgets with much more conservative esti-
mates than the revenue forecasts of the Ministry of 
Finance. Municipal tax revenues were on average 
underestimated by 7% in the past 15 years. 
Numerous foreign studies confirm that local gov-
ernment tax revenue forecasts are influenced not only 
by the economic environment, but also by the fiscal 
situation, technical and organisational aspects and 
political factors. Knowing the major determinants of 
tax revenue forecasting errors allows us to assess if 
they have purely technical reasons or if political 
factors play a role as well, because budget estimates 
are inherently sensitive to political pressures (see 
Plesko, 1988). 
First, we discuss the role of revenue forecasting as 
a part of the municipal budgetary process and review 
the literature dealing with the identification of the 
determinants of tax revenue forecasting errors at the 
local level. Then, we evaluate the accuracy of munici-
pal budgets and their major components in the Czech 
Republic in the past decade. Thereafter, we present the 
empirical analysis of the determinants of tax revenue 
forecasting errors in 198 municipalities of extended 
scope between 2002 and 2011 using the generalised 
method of moments (GMM). 
2. Revenue forecasting as a part of the municipal 
budgetary process 
Public budgeting is a process of decision-making 
about resources and their allocation. It is a sequence of 
numerous steps taken by various actors that can be 
grouped into four main stages: budget preparation by 
the executive body, budget debate and approval by the 
legislative body, budget execution and budget control. 
The municipal budgetary process in the Czech Repub-
lic is mainly regulated by the Budgetary rules for 
territorial entities (250/2000 Coll.), which lists the 
basic requirements municipalities must comply with 
and the Law on municipal establishment (128/2000 
Coll.), which specifies the roles different subjects play 
in the budgetary process. Municipal management is 
also regulated by the Law on the audit of local gov-
ernment units (420/2004 Coll.) and the Law on finan-
cial control in the public administration (320/2001 
Coll.). The central regulation leaves significant space 
for municipalities to choose how they will proceed in 
preparation including revenue forecasting and debat-
ing the draft budget. It only requires that the draft 
budget and draft final account are available to the 
public for comments and that they are approved by the 
municipal council (see Klazar and Sedmihradská 
(2006) for more details). 
Revenue forecasting is one of the first steps while 
preparing the draft budget and its results influence the 
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decision-making of resource allocation, thus any 
inaccuracy of the forecasts may have tangible impacts. 
Inaccuracy can occur in the form of both underestima-
tion and overestimation; however, the costs of overes-
timation are much higher than those of underestima-
tion (see Rodgers and Joyce, 1996). 
Overestimation means that the estimated and ap-
proved revenues exceed the real (actual) ones, thus not 
all approved expenditure can take place and cuts are 
needed. Revenue overestimation softens hard budget 
constraints and shifts the decision-making about the 
needed cuts from the preparation and approval phase 
of the budgetary process to the execution phase. Rubin 
(1987) stresses the associated shift in power in favour 
of the budget officer. As municipalities in the Czech 
Republic do not operate under strict balanced budget 
requirement, revenue overestimation may result in 
budget deficits. 
Underestimation means that during the budget 
year, some additional revenues appear that can be 
either added to the year-end balance or spent on newly 
approved expenditure. The decision-making process 
during the year, however, may be less transparent than 
the standard budgetary process. There is required less 
publicity for budget amendments than the draft budget 
and there is a common praxis of the delegation of 
decision-making power from the municipal council to 
municipal commission or mayor (see Češková and 
Kinšt, 2011). As the underestimation of budget reve-
nues is considered to be fiscally responsible and thus 
positive, some authors, e.g. Rodgers and Joyce (1996), 
argue that a part of the revenue forecast error can only 
be explained by the very rational choice to underesti-
mate revenues in order to provide a cushion against a 
recession that is unanticipated. Špalek and Mora-
vanský (2005) draw similar conclusions for the Czech 
Republic. 
Forecasting budget revenues is influenced by the 
revenue structure. Municipal revenues in the Czech 
Republic are composed of various revenue types, 
which can be classified as (1) own revenues or grants 
and (2) current or capital/investment. The ability to 
exactly estimate individual revenue types differs 
significantly. Current own revenues such as taxes and 
current no-tax revenues such as rental incomes and 
user fees are quite regular and thus easy to forecast, 
whereas other types are either one-time revenues, such 
as all types of capital revenues, or subject to decisions 
or factors outside of the municipality, such as grants. 
Municipalities own significant property, which can be 
sold. However, these revenues are usually not ap-
proved before the exact amount is known and thus 
they do not appear in the approved budget. A similar 
approach is applied in the case of conditional capital 
grants and to some extent grants that only flow 
through the municipal budget such as social allowanc-
es, which municipalities pay out to recipients, while 
they receive the exact amount as a grant. The only 
grant type that is always included in the approved 
budget is the grant (contribution) for the execution of 
the delegated power, which is determined based on a 
formula. 
The existing case studies, elaborated as bachelor or 
master theses at the University of Economics in 
Prague, present surprisingly similar descriptions of 
municipal tax revenue forecasting practices in differ-
ent municipalities: forecasts are based on human 
judgment and the basis for the tax revenue forecast is 
the last year’s collection. The forecast of the Ministry 
of Finance, if taken into account at all, is the best 
possible scenario, never fully included in the budget. 
Municipalities do not rely on any, even the simplest, 
forecasting methods such as simple moving average or 
regression against time (see, for example, Talíř, 2012 
and Radilová, 2012). 
The accuracy of tax revenue forecasts is influenced 
by numerous factors, which Chatagny and Soguel 
(2012) divide into four main groups: economic envi-
ronment, fiscal situation, technical and organisational 
aspects and political factors. Some of these factors are 
the same for all municipalities such as the national 
GDP growth rate, inflation rate or date of municipal 
council elections, but many factors are specific to each 
municipality. For example, economic situation in a 
particular municipality may influence tax revenues as 
well. Similarly, each municipality is in a different 
fiscal situation. 
Fiscal situation influences revenue forecasting bias 
toward underestimation. Rubin (1987) finds that the 
greater the city’s overall fiscal stress, the greater is 
the likelihood of overestimating revenue. Thus, fiscal 
hardship leads to an acceptance of a thinner forecast 
cushion than generally wanted. This finding is con-
sistent with Rose and Smith (2012), who find that U.S. 
states that adopted budget stabilisation funds, i.e., 
have reserve funds at their disposal in the case of an 
unexpected event, are less conservative in their reve-
nue estimates. Thus, again, a thinner forecast cushion 
is accepted because real reserves exist. At the same 
time, it is expected that the adjustment of municipal 
behaviour is quite slow and thus an error in a previous 
year persists to some extent in the current year (Goe-
minne et al., 2008). 
While revenue forecasting is most of all a technical 
process regardless of whether sophisticated methods 
are used, the approved budget, or exactly the expected 
revenues approved in the annual budget, is a result of 
political decision-making. Therefore, regardless of 
how technically competent or correct specific forecast 
models tend to be in determining future estimates, the 
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budget process is, nevertheless, influenced by compet-
ing actors attempting to shape the budget into a form 
that is most amenable to their needs (Brogan, 2012).  
As mentioned above, less conservative revenue 
estimates may allow the approval of higher or addi-
tional expenditure. This can be especially tempting 
before elections when the incumbent aims to show 
voters their competence and get re-elected. Empirical 
evidence on the existence of the political budget cycle 
in revenue forecasts shows, however, only weak 
support (see Bischoff and Gohout (2010) in the case of 
German states or Chatagny and Soguel (2012) in the 
case of Swiss cantons). 
The outcomes of the decision-making are influ-
enced by the strength or composition of the decision-
making body. In the case of more fragmented gov-
ernments, politicians are less certain about their 
positions after the election and tend to act more 
strategically (see Ashworth et al., 2005). Goeminne et 
al. (2008) suppose that more fragmented local gov-
ernments are more optimistic than a single-party 
government, because optimistic revenue forecasts can 
better accommodate the claims of individual parties. 
Their research into tax revenue forecasting accuracy in 
Flemish municipalities confirms this hypothesis only 
partly, because two-party governments seem to be 
more optimistic than single-party governments, but 
governments with more than three parties are more 
cautious. Bischoff and Gohout (2010) find no evi-
dence that coalition governments produce higher tax 
estimates than single-party governments. 
3. Budget inaccuracy in the Czech Republic 
Budget inaccuracy is the difference between the 
approved (budgeted, estimated, planned) and actual 
(real) revenues or expenditure. In this paper, the 
following budget inaccuracy or forecasting error 
indicator is used: 
 ,x xx
x
B ABI
A
  (1) 
where x is the analysed budget segment (revenues, 
expenditure or a line of them), BI is the budget inaccu-
racy/error, B is the approved amount and A is the 
actual amount. 
Inaccuracy can be in the form of either overestima-
tion, i.e., the approved revenues (or expenditure) 
exceed the actual revenues (or expenditure) and BIx > 
0, or underestimation, i.e., the estimated revenues (or 
expenditure) are lower than the actual ones and BIx < 
0. Thus, when BIx grows, the forecasts are less con-
servative, i.e., the underestimation is smaller, it turns 
into an overestimation or the overestimation grows. 
The growth of BIx thus does not generally mean an 
improvement in budget accuracy. 
The development of budget inaccuracy of munici-
pal tax and total revenues in the municipalities of 
extended scope between 2001 and 2011 is described in 
Figure 1. It shows the average inaccuracy and 95% 
confidence interval of the indicator. The difference 
between the drawn line and zero line shows the 
volume of additional revenues received during the 
budget year with only the exception of tax revenues in 
2009 when tax revenues were missing. 
Figure 1 Tax and total municipal revenue inaccuracy in 
municipalities with extended scope (2001–2011) 
 
Source: ARIS, ÚFIS, own calculations and presentation 
The total revenues show relatively stable develop-
ment. The correlation analysis confirms our expecta-
tion that revenue inaccuracy is negatively influenced 
by the share of grants and capital revenues in total 
revenues, the correlation coefficients being –0.2531 
and –0.1754, respectively. The inaccuracy of tax 
revenues shows, with the exception of 2009, im-
provements. We suppose that one of the reasons could 
be the continuous decline of the importance of reve-
nues from the individual income tax paid by the self-
employed. Altogether, 30% of proceeds from this tax 
remain in the municipality of the permanent residence 
of the particular entrepreneur and thus this tax is much 
more volatile as well as hard to forecast than the taxes 
shared based on the revenue-sharing formula. The 
average share of this tax in total tax revenues in the 
analysed municipalities fell from 9.8% in 2001 to 
2.1% 2011. The correlation coefficient between tax 
revenue inaccuracy and the share of individual income 
tax paid by the self-employed is –0.3739. 
Closer examination of the tax forecasting errors in 
the municipalities of extended scope shows that there 
are significant differences among individual munici-
palities and that the extremes are becoming closer 
over time (see Table 1). At the same time, the average 
values for all municipalities and municipalities with 
extended scope are similar. The forecast of the Minis-
try of Finance oscillates around the 90th percentile: 
L. Sedmihradská, A. Čabla – Budget accuracy in Czech municipalities and determinants of tax revenue forecasting errors 
 
201
thus, the figures confirm the findings of the case 
studies that municipalities consider these forecasts to 
be too optimistic. 
Figure 2 shows the development of expenditure 
inaccuracy. The inaccuracy of current expenditure is 
not shown because the line overlapped that of total 
expenditure inaccuracy and the picture would not be 
clear. The inaccuracy of expenditure copies, as ex-
pected, the development of the inaccuracy of reve-
nues. The correlation coefficient is 0.8548. The 
development of capital expenditure inaccuracy copies 
the development of total expenditure inaccuracy until 
2008. This is interesting, as one would expect the 
gradual approval of capital grants to also lead to the 
gradual approval of capital investments and thus that 
the inaccuracy of capital expenditure would be higher. 
Of course, the analysis of average values is simplified, 
as confirmed by the greater spread of the 0.95% 
confidence interval in the case of capital expenditure. 
Since 2009, the situation has changed; in the budgets 
of 2009 and 2011, more capital investments were 
approved than were actually realised. We suppose that 
Figure 2 Expenditure inaccuracy in municipalities with 
extended scope (2001–2011) 
Source: ARIS, ÚFIS, own calculations and presentation 
this is a result of the growing number of investments 
financed through the EU structural funds, when the 
administration process takes longer and intervenes in 
several budget years. 
4. Determinants of tax revenue forecasting errors 
The key factor influencing the tax revenue forecasting 
error (BI) is the economic situation, which can be 
characterised by three major indicators: GDP growth 
rate, inflation rate and unemployment rate. While data 
on the former two are available only nationally, the 
unemployment rate is available for individual munici-
palities with extended scope. Higher economic growth 
in the current year (GDP) results in higher actual 
revenues (i.e., BI decreases). Higher inflation (INFL) 
means higher actual nominal revenues (i.e., BI de-
creases). Higher unemployment (UNEMPL) results in 
lower tax collections due to both lower incomes and 
lower consumption (i.e., BI grows). This relationship 
was confirmed by Chatagny and Soguel (2012) in the 
case of Swiss cantons. Owing to the revenue-sharing 
mechanism, the differences in the unemployment rate 
among municipalities have only a limited impact; 
however, we can perceive it as a proxy for the charac-
teristics of the economic situation in the particular 
municipality as it can indirectly impact the activity of 
self-employed and thus the share of the individual 
income tax paid by the self-employed. To sum up, 
improved economic conditions increase the underes-
timation of tax revenue forecasts. 
The impact of the size of the municipality (POP) is 
uncertain: bigger municipalities employ more special-
ised staff and revenue forecasting can be based on 
more sophisticated methods. On the other hand, bigger 
municipalities start budget preparations earlier (see 
Sedmihradská, 2006), meaning that uncertainty about 
further development is bigger. Neither Rubin (1987) 
nor Goeminne et al. (2008) find an effect of popula-
tion size on the forecasting error. Chatagny and  
 
Table 1 Tax forecasting error in municipalities with extended scope (2001–2011) 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Mean –0.086 –0.116 –0.105 –0.096 –0.107 –0.058 –0.079 –0.084 0.115 –0.032 0.006 
Minimum –0.525 –0.341 –0.374 –0.331 –0.341 –0.248 –0.234 –0.263 –0.156 –0.263 –0.193 
Maximum 0.306 0.194 0.105 0.099 0.090 0.100 0.081 0.060 0.377 0.171 0.153 
Percentile 10 –0.249 –0.241 –0.210 –0.189 –0.200 –0.155 –0.149 –0.169 0.006 –0.123 –0.074 
Percentile 90 0.041 –0.010 –0.014 –0.020 –0.026 0.020 –0.009 –0.019 0.207 0.047 0.078 
Variance 0.017 0.008 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.005 0.004 
Std.Dev. 0.129 0.092 0.081 0.071 0.071 0.070 0.056 0.059 0.081 0.073 0.062 
Nation wide 
average –0.080 –0.125 –0.106 –0.089 –0.126 –0.070 –0.081 –0.098 0.098 –0.041 –0.009 
MF forecast –0.006 –0.032 –0.023 0.006 –0.016 –0.016 0.244 0.080 0.075 
Source: ARIS, ÚFIS, Draft state budgets 2003–2011 own calculations and presentation 
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Soguel (2012) find that smaller cantons tend to under-
estimate tax revenue more than big ones because 
forecasting in small cantons is more difficult: if a 
wealthy taxpayer moves out, the impact on tax reve-
nues is more important and therefore small cantons are 
more cautious. The same may be true in the case of 
Czech municipalities and the individual income tax 
paid by the self-employed. 
The fiscal situation of a municipality is described 
through two indicators: total revenues per capita 
(REV) and budget balance as a share of total revenues 
(BAL). These indicators do not indicate if a munici-
pality observes fiscal stress; however, they indicate if 
the fiscal situation is more or less favorable. We 
expect that municipalities with lower revenues per 
capita and budget deficits will be more optimistic. 
Thus, BI grows if per capita revenues and budget 
balance falls. 
Owing to the high volatility of the individual in-
come tax paid by the self-employed and corporate 
income tax paid by the particular municipality (i.e., 
taxes shared based on the origin principle), we sup-
pose that the high share of these taxes relative to total 
tax revenues (ENT) can lead to higher forecasting 
caution in the case of tax revenues (i.e., BI decreases). 
Based on the description of the tax revenue fore-
casting process in the Czech Republic, we expect the 
difference between tax collection in year t and (t–1) to 
influence the forecasting error: a substantial increase 
in the actual tax collection in t will mean higher 
underestimation (i.e., BI decreases). In order to cap-
ture this phenomenon, we use the variable INCREM, 
which is constructed similar to BI: 
 , 1 ,,
,
,i t i ti t
i t
A A
INCREM
A
   (2) 
where Ai,t are tax revenues in municipality i in year t. 
At the same time, conservatism in tax revenue 
forecasts (last year’s budget error BI-1) should lead to 
conservatism in total revenue forecasts (i.e., BI de-
creases). 
The theory of the political budget cycle assumes 
that revenue forecasts are more optimistic before 
elections (ELECT); therefore, BI should be higher in 
election years (i.e., 2006 and 2010). The weak gov-
ernment hypothesis proposes that more fragmented 
governments tend to be more optimistic in order to 
accommodate requests from all political participants. 
The fragmentation of municipal government is de-
scribed by the number of political parties or groupings 
participating in the municipal council (PARTY): more 
parties mean a higher BI. 
To empirically assess the relation between the 
forecast error and these economic, fiscal, organisa-
tional and political factors, we use a panel dataset 
from 2002 to 2011 for 198 municipalities of extended 
scope. Of the total 206 municipalities of extended 
scope, we exclude eight cities (Brno, Liberec, Opava, 
Ostrava, Pardubice, Plzeň, Praha and Ústí nad La-
bem), which are divided into districts with their own 
budgets. We do not have data on individual districts’ 
budgets and the evaluation of the tax revenue forecast-
ing errors of aggregated (consolidated) budgets seems 
to be inappropriate. In the case of repeated elections 
(in 2006 in Most and Havířov, and in 2010 in Český 
Těšín and Roudnice nad Labem), we take into account 
the results of these repeated elections. 
Financial data are acquired from the Automated 
Budget Information System (ARIS) and Accounting 
and Financial Information System (ÚFIS) adminis-
tered by the Ministry of Finance. These data are based 
on the Czech budget classification, i.e., all data are 
recorded on the cash principle and we use current 
prices. The data for GDP growth rate, inflation rate 
and municipal council composition are from the Czech 
Statistical Office and for unemployment rate from the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. The specifica-
tion of individual variables and data sources is in 
Appendix, and the descriptive statistics are shown in 
Table 2. 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics  
Valid N Mean Min. Max. Std.Dev.
BI 1980 –0.06 –0.37 0.40 0.10 
BI-1 1980 –0.04 –0.40 0.50 0.09 
GDP 1980 3.31 –4.51 7.00 3.15 
ELECT 1980 0.30 0.00 1.00 0.46 
POP 1980 18213.15 2884.00 102246.00 17414.31
UNEMPL 1980 9.45 1.50 24.20 3.75 
REV 1980 24967.14 11140.06 75264.10 6421.09
ENT 1980 0.13 0.00 0.50 0.06 
BAL 1980 –0.01 –0.59 0.40 0.10 
INFL 1980 2.26 0.10 6.30 1.56 
PARTY 1980 6.31 3.00 14.00 1.29 
We estimate the following multivariate model to 
test our predictions (subscripts i and t refer to munici-
palities and time, respectively): 
 
, 1 2 3 ,
4 , 5 , 6 , 7 ,
8 , 1 9 , 10 ,
11 , .
i t t t i t
i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t
t i t
BI a b GDP b INFL b UNEMPL
b BAL b REV b ENT b POP
b BI b INCREM b PARTY
b ELECT e

    
    
   
 
 (3) 
For the estimation of the model, we use the Arel-
lano–Bond system GMM estimator, which is particu-
larly appropriate for dynamic panel datasets. We use a 
two-step estimator, which has the advantage that the 
standard covariance matrix is robust to panel-specific 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. Standard errors 
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in this estimation are in some cases downward biased, 
but we use a specific Stata procedure to get the finite-
sample corrected to the two-step covariance matrix. 
We also tried a one-step estimator, but the results did 
not differ significantly, so we accepted the results 
from the two-step estimator. 
An important part of the model is always its diag-
nostics. In the GMM estimator, the most important 
diagnostics are the Sargan and Hansen tests and the 
Arellano–Bond test for autocorrelation (AR()). The 
Sargan and Hansen tests both have the null hypothesis 
of the instruments as a group are exogenous and so 
we want them not to reject the null hypothesis. The 
Sargan test is not robust, whereas the Hansen test is, 
but the latter is weakened by many instruments, 
whereas the former is not. We use both of them. AR 
tests have the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation in 
differenced residuals; whereas it is expected to reject 
this hypothesis in the AR(1) test, we do not want to 
reject it in the AR(2) test. 
We firstly estimated all the explanatory variables 
in the model and continued by discarding the variable 
with the largest p-value larger than 0.05 in order to 
maintain all tests at favorable p-values (significance 
level for tests during the procedure set at 0.01). After 
each step, we tried to reintroduce each yet discarded 
variable independently into the model to ensure that it 
is still not appropriate in the new model at a signifi-
cance level of 0.05. When it was appropriate, we 
omitted the variable in the model. Through this pro-
cess, mimicking the backward stepwise selection used 
in linear regression, we arrived at the final model 
described in Table 3.  
Neither the Sargan nor Hansen tests reject the null 
hypotheses at a significance level of 0.05, while the 
AR(1) test has the expected result and the AR(2) test 
has a p-value of 0.044, which we still find to be 
acceptable. 
The obtained results confirm the influence of GDP 
growth in the current year and inflation on actual 
revenues and consequently the negative impact on the 
forecasting error. The effect of unemployment is not 
significant, which proves that the tax-sharing mecha-
nism equalises the differences among municipalities 
and that the actual economic situation in a municipali-
ty has little effect on tax revenues.  
The fiscal situation, characterised by per capita 
revenues and the budget balance, does not have a 
significant effect on the tax forecasting error. Thus, 
we were not able to confirm the findings of Rubin 
(1987) that fiscal stress leads to more optimistic 
revenue forecasts. This can be caused, at least to some 
extent, by the construction of the variables. While 
Rubin (1987) uses an aggregated indicator of fiscal 
stress, we were not able to evaluate neither indebted-
ness nor reserves due to limited data availability. 
Table 3 Estimates of the tax revenue forecasting error 
models (198 cross-sectional units, time-series length 10, 
1,980 observations) 
Parametr p-value 
GDP  –0.0165 0.0000 
INFL  –0.0119 0.0000 
UNEMPL  – – 
BAL  – – 
REV  – – 
ENT  –0.6272 0.0000 
POP  – – 
BI-1  – – 
INCREM  –0.2657 0.0000 
PARTY  0.0165 0.0000 
ELECT  0.0349 0.0000 
CONS  – – 
AR(1)  –6.760 0.000 
AR(2)  –2.020 0.044 
Sargan  15.140 0.057 
Hansen  8.850 0.355 
 
 
On the other hand, the structure of tax revenues 
(taxes shared based on the origin principle versus 
other taxes) has a significant impact: the higher is the 
share of the taxes shared based on the origin, the 
higher is the underestimation. Municipalities are 
aware of the higher volatility and uncertainty of these 
tax revenues and so they are more cautious during 
their estimation. This finding is consistent with the 
findings of both Chatagny and Soguel (2012) and 
Goeminne et al. (2008), who find that municipalities 
deriving a larger share of their revenues from local 
taxation underestimate their tax revenue more. Of 
course, we are aware of the differences between local 
taxes and taxes shared based on the origin principle. 
The size of the municipality does not have a signif-
icant effect on the tax revenue forecasting error: thus, 
the assumption based on the Swiss experience (see 
Chatagny and Soguel, 2012) that smaller municipali-
ties are more conservative was not proven. This can be 
caused by our sample, which did not comprise small 
municipalities (the smallest municipality included has 
almost 3,000 inhabitants). 
While foreign studies such as Chatagny and 
Soguel (2012) and Goeminne et al. (2008) find a 
significant influence of the lagged dependent variable 
(i.e., that local governments with a small forecasting 
error in the past tend to have a small forecasting error 
in the current year as well), we were not able to prove 
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the effect of this factor. On the other hand, our results 
confirm the incremental character of the revenue 
forecasting process: in the case of bigger year-to-year 
tax revenue increases, the tax revenue forecast be-
comes too conservative. 
Both the tested political factors have a significant 
influence on the tax revenue forecasting error: munic-
ipalities are more optimistic when more political 
parties or groupings form the municipal council and in 
election years. This is in line with the expectation of 
Goeminne et al. (2008): As parties in a coalition 
government are likely to be less certain about future 
power than one-party governments, there is a larger 
incentive to be (over) optimistic with respect to budg-
eted revenues. 
This finding is particularly interesting, because it 
confirms that municipal politics influence budget 
management. While the foreign literature dealing with 
these aspects at the local government level is quite 
rich, the situation in the Czech Republic is basically 
unexplored with only a few exceptions. Šťastná 
(2009) finds weak evidence that party fragmentation 
in municipal councils decreases capital expenditure 
and expenditure on housing, while Sedmihradská et al. 
(2011) confirm the existence of the political budget 
cycle at the municipal level in the case of capital 
expenditure, i.e., there is a significant increase in 
capital expenditure and a significant decrease in 
current expenditure prior to elections. 
5. Conclusion 
Approved municipal budgets amount to only about 
82% of the executed ones. Municipalities can approve 
only expenditure with a clear source of financing, i.e., 
revenues, reserves or borrowing. Several revenue 
types become certain only during the course of the 
budget year (such as conditional capital grants or 
proceeds from property sales), meaning that munici-
palities do not include them in the approved budget 
but rather include them later. This is the first reason 
behind the low accuracy of municipal budgets. 
The second reason is the systematic underestima-
tion of tax revenues. The tax revenue forecasting error 
was on average 7% in the past 15 years with signifi-
cant variation among individual municipalities and 
years. The dominant tax revenue forecasting practice 
in Czech municipalities is human judgment based on 
the last year’s tax collection. Tax forecasting errors 
are influenced by the economic situation: higher 
economic growth and higher inflation influence 
positively the actual amount, thus leading to higher 
underestimation. The differences among individual 
municipalities depend, for instance, on the structure of 
tax revenues. Municipalities with a higher share of 
taxes shared based on the origin principle (i.e., indi-
vidual income tax paid by the self-employed and 
corporate income tax paid by the municipality) are 
careful when including these tax revenues in their 
budgets, which leads to the higher underestimation of 
tax revenues. Higher underestimation is also observed 
in municipalities that expect small year-to-year chang-
es in their tax revenues, i.e., their revenue forecasting 
is strongly incremental. 
Despite the general opinion that tax forecasting is a 
purely technical process, the impact of political factors 
is quite strong: municipalities with more fragmented 
municipal councils, i.e., municipal councils composed 
of more political parties or groupings, approve more 
optimistic tax revenue forecasts. At the same time, the 
forecasts are more optimistic in election years. This 
kind of opportunistic behaviour is described in the 
literature (e.g. Goeminne et al., 2008), but was empiri-
cally proven only partially. 
Further research into the accuracy of municipal 
budgets should focus on the expenditure side of the 
budget and show what kinds of budget amendments 
are approved during the budget year and by whom (the 
municipal council, commission or mayor). Then, we 
would be able to evaluate the extent of opportunism 
and transparency in the municipal budgetary process. 
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Appendix 
List of variables and data sources  
BALi,t is the budget balance as a share of total revenues, i.e., the difference between total revenues and total 
expenditure divided by total revenues. The definition of total revenues complies with Czech budget classification 
classes 1–4 and the definition of total expenditure complies with Czech budget classification total expenditure 
classes 5 and 6. The data source is the ARIS and ÚFIS, Ministry of Finance, http://wwwinfo.mfcr.cz/aris/ and 
http://wwwinfo.mfcr.cz/ufis/, 2 June 2012. 
BIi,t is the budget inaccuracy of the tax revenues calculated based on formula (1). The definition of tax revenues 
complies with Czech budget classification class 1. The data source is the ARIS and ÚFIS, Ministry of Finance, 
http://wwwinfo.mfcr.cz/aris/ and http://wwwinfo.mfcr.cz/ufis/, 2 June 2012. 
ELECTIONt is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in election years (i.e., 2006 and 2010) and 0 in other 
years. 
ENTi,t is the share of individual income tax paid by entrepreneurs and corporate income tax paid by the particular 
municipality in tax revenues. The definition of the individual income tax paid by the self-employed complies with 
Czech budget classification line 1112, that of the corporate income tax paid by the particular municipality com-
plies with Czech budget classification line 1122 and that of tax revenues complies with Czech budget classifica-
tion class 1. The data source is the ARIS and ÚFIS, Ministry of Finance, http://wwwinfo.mfcr.cz/aris/ and 
http://wwwinfo.mfcr.cz/ufis/, 2 June 2012. 
GDPt is the annual change in GDP expressed in real terms. The data source is the Czech Statistical Office, 
http://www.czso.cz/eng/redakce.nsf/i/statistics, 2 June 2012. 
INCREMi,t is the year-to-year change in tax revenues calculated based on formula (2). The definition of tax 
revenues complies with Czech budget classification class 1. The data source is the ARIS and ÚFIS, Ministry of 
Finance, http://wwwinfo.mfcr.cz/aris/ and http://wwwinfo.mfcr.cz/ufis/, 2 June 2012. 
INFLt is the yearly average inflation rate. The data source is the Czech Statistical Office, http://www.czso.cz/eng/ 
redakce.nsf/i/statistics, 2 June 2012. 
PARTYi,t is the number of political parties or groupings present in the municipal council. Parties elected in 2002 
are counted in 2003 to 2006, parties elected in 2006 are counted in 2007–2010 and parties elected in 2011 are 
counted in 2011. The data source is the Czech Statistical Office, http://volby.cz/, 20 November 2012. 
POPi,t is the number of inhabitants. The data source is the Czech Statistical Office, http://www.czso.cz/csu/2012 
edicniplan.nsf/p/1301-12, 2 June 2012. 
REVi,t represents total municipal revenues per capita. The definition of total revenues complies with Czech 
budget classification classes 1–4. The data source is the ARIS and ÚFIS, Ministry of Finance, 
http://wwwinfo.mfcr.cz/aris/ and http://wwwinfo.mfcr.cz/ufis/, 2 June 2012. 
UNEMPi.t is the unemployment rate, i.e., the number of registered unemployed divided by the number of eco-
nomically active inhabitants, in December. The data source is the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, 
http://portal.mpsv.cz/sz/stat/nz/uzem, 15 June 2012. 
 
